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Trump’s very own platform? Two




Should we applaud social media platforms for finally restricting Donald
Trump’s accounts? May we hold them responsible for allowing incitement to
violence to spread? Should it be up to private actors to decide whether or not
to ban the US President from the digital public sphere? Most probably have a
clear opinion on these questions, but in fact, they aren’t as easy to answer as
it may seem.
The run on the Capitol on January 6th has dramatically shown, once again, that the
spread of lies and hateful speech leads to real-life harm. But protecting freedom
of expression and the free formation of opinion online while setting rules for a
civilized communicative space is a complicated endeavor. It poses many questions
of constitutional law and power structures in democratic societies, especially in the
US but with repercussions for the rest of the world. What would change if Trump
would either launch his own service or if he shifted to another service, assuming
there would be no content moderation in both cases?
Scenario 1: Trump starts his own social network.
After being “indefinitely” (Facebook) and “permanently” (Twitter) suspended from the
largest social media platforms, Trump suggested he could start his own service.
Two factual aspects make this scenario rather unlikely (I’ll get to the legal questions
afterwards): Trump isn’t interested in dialogue. He has been using Twitter as a
“typewriter”, not as a place to exchange viewpoints. He wants a channel to send
unilaterally, not a forum. Secondly, he would still need the infrastructure necessary
to operate. Usually, web infrastructure providers are invisible to the public and
do not interfere, but when they do it makes a difference. After the attack on the
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Capitol last Thursday, host providers could be reluctant to support a Trump-Twitter
or Trumpbook, like Amazon suspended Parler (also because the public awareness
on these matters has greatly increased). App-stores too could ban the new social
network’s app (they’ve already banned Parler). The lack of infrastructure doesn’t
make it impossible for Trump, of course, but less probable.
Assuming Trump starts his own service, he will be very free to express his
viewpoints – even more than so far. Without Twitter’s or Facebook’s community
guidelines/standards, there will be no control over what he decides to share. The
protection of free speech under the First Amendment is very broad and it allows
only very few exceptions. Trump will be even more untamed after Joe Biden’s
inauguration because his social media profile will no longer meet the requirements
for a governmental public forum. According to a court decision in the case of Knight
First Amendment Institute v. Trump, the tweets sent by the President qualified as a
designated public forum and he was therefore not allowed to exclude (by “blocking”)
people from accessing his Twitter account. Governmental communication via private
digital actors is a whole other aspect of the underlying question, but what counts
here is that: once Trump isn’t a government official anymore he will no longer have
to allow people in his bubble. His private social network could become yet another
refugium for extremists and conspiracy ideologists. Authorities will have almost no
legal means to restrict it without violating the First Amendment.
Scenario 2: Trump uses a conservative platform to continue
spreading his viewpoints without the barrier of content moderation.
He could turn to a platform such as Parler to avoid “strict” content rules. Indeed,
Trump and other conservatives have been criticizing platforms such as Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter for propagating a left-wing perspective and “censoring” them
(Trump just before his supporters stormed the Capitol: “We will finally hold big tech
accountable.”).
Under Sec. 230 CDA, social media platforms don’t have to moderate: they can
simply act as mere “pipes”, as opposed to editors according to the Supreme Court
(Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147). Due to the provided immunity from liability,
it is up to social networks to moderate content by, for instance, banning hate
speech and misinformation, or not (as we have witnessed over the past four years).
Because, under the First Amendment, the State is, in principle, not allowed to
regulate speech (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech”),
this power over what may or may not be said is reserved to non-state actors, i.e.
in legal relationships between private parties. Under this legal regime, Twitter is
allowed to moderate or ban content because social media platforms are private
actors and therefore not bound by the First Amendment. Under the state action
doctrine, private parties are exempt from applying third-party fundamental rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The rationale behind the state action doctrine is to
preserve private autonomy, leaving the relationship between private parties immune
to the application of the Constitution. Private parties may only be subject to the
same obligations as the government if they fall under the public function or the
entanglement exception.[1]
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One might argue that social media platforms are not mere private actors, like other
market participants. Instead, they could be considered state actors in order for them
to respect their users’ right to free speech (under to the public function exception).
This has been a constant discussion among First Amendment scholars but courts
are reluctant to treat social media platforms as state actors even when, according
to the Supreme Court, they provide “the most important places for the exchange of
views” (Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___ (2017)). It is, therefore, at the
platform’s discretion to remove or not certain types of speech.
Could Trump then behave the way he has so far if he were to use another platform?
Most likely yes, but that’s not connected to the type of platform: it has to do with the
First Amendment’s protection. While one of the very few exceptions to the scope of
protection is incitement to violence, the criteria established by the jurisprudence are
hardly applicable to online speech.  Incitement to violence may only be forbidden
if it leads to “imminent lawless action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444) and
the point in time may not be in “some indefinite future time” (Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105). According to these criteria, online hate speech isn’t concrete enough in
most cases because its effects can unfold at any future point in time. Hence, even
if constant incitement fuels violent actions and can have real consequences as we
have seen (not only at the Capitol), it has to be more specific. This leads me to the
conclusion that Trump’s speech just before the storm on the Capitol (“we are going
to walk down Pennsylvania Avenue, and we are going to the Capitol, (…) and give
them the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country.”) would
have been (if posted on a conservative network) probably concrete enough to justify
an exception to the First Amendment. But for the removal of other, less specific
incitements via social media, we would depend on the respective platform to act.
What’s next?
Overall, the whole situation would become even worse if Trump turns away from the
platforms he has been using so far. This result leaves no room for doubt: adapting
First Amendment doctrines to the digital public sphere is a pressing need, not a
matter of scholar opinion. It needs to be addressed by the courts (because Congress
has only very limited options under the First Amendment) in order to overcome
the current obstacles and to provide a democratically legitimate answer, instead
of allocating these substantial matters to the goodwill of the biggest social media
platforms. One option being a new interpretation of the criteria mentioned supra,
allowing for a contemporary protection of First Amendment values.
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